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Abstract
The cybersecurity of power systems is jeopardized by the threat of spoofing and man-in-themiddle style attacks due to a lack of physical layer device authentication techniques for operational
technology (OT) communication networks. OT networks cannot support the active probing cybersecurity methods that are popular in information technology (IT) networks. Furthermore, both active
and passive scanning techniques are susceptible to medium access control (MAC) address spoofing
when operating at Layer 2 of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. This thesis aims to
analyze the role of deep learning in passively authenticating Ethernet devices by their communication signals. This method operates at the physical layer or Layer 1 of the OSI model. The security
model collects signal data from Ethernet device transmissions, applies deep learning to gather distinguishing features from signal data, and uses these features to make an authentication decision on
the Ethernet devices. The proposed approach is passive, automatic, and spoof-resistant. The role
of deep learning is critical to the security model. This thesis will look at analyzing and improving
deep learning at each step of the security model including data processing, model training, model
efficiency, transfer learning on new devices, and device authentication.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
The cybersecurity of power systems is jeopardized by the threat of spoofing and man-inthe-middle style attacks due to a lack of physical layer device authentication techniques for OT
communication networks. While cybersecurity defense strategies stay ahead of new attack vectors
in IT networks, devices on OT networks contain legacy devices that cannot integrate modern defense
strategies. This leaves many OT networks vulnerable.

1.1

Operational Technology Vulnerabilities
Network security strategies usually involve a username/password or digital certificate to

authenticate users. Passwords are commonly used by security systems, but they must be complex,
regularly maintained, and stored on a deployed device. There have been many noteworthy cases of
default passwords allowing intruders into their system [41], [46]. Digital certificates are an effective
security strategy on IT networks. However, OT networks contain legacy or low power industrial
control system (ICS) devices that are not suited for digital certificates. These devices are often
incapable of receiving software updates and do not have the complexity necessary for encryption.
The result is a vulnerable OT network.

1

1.2

Deep Learning in Cybersecurity
Deep learning has become a popular tool in cybersecurity in recent years [40]. Long Short

Term Memory (LSTM) networks [21], popular for analyzing data over time, have been utilized for
intrusion detection [23], classifying malicious apps [44], and phishing detection [8]. Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs), popular for analyzing data in images, have shown success in
intrusion detection in internet of things (IoT) networks [43], malware detection [48], and phishing
detection [47]. DCNNs deployed for intrusion detection will be the focus of this work.

1.3

MAC Addresses and Spoofing
MAC address is a discrete identifying address assigned to a computer or device. MAC

addresses are used in Ethernet, WiFi, and Bluetooth. The data link layer or Layer 2 of the OSI
model make use of MAC addresses through the network interface controller (NIC). MAC address
spoofing is the process of masking a MAC address as an operator’s chosen address which effectively
masks the computer’s identity from the network infrastructure. This is often done for malicious
purposes. Other identifiers such as a device’s operating system, software version, or packet delay
can be spoofed as well. Spoofing is a major threat to intrusion detection in cybersecurity.

1.4

Statement of Work
This thesis proposes the use of deep learning for intrusion detection in OT networks lever-

aging physical layer communication data for spoof-resistance.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will give Background on methods
presented. Chapter 3 will discuss the deep learning security model. Chapter 4 will discuss deploying
the deep learning security model at the edge. Chapter 5 will discuss the authentication approaches
for intrusion devices. Chapter 6 will discuss results from experiments in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Finally, Chapter 7 will look at conclusions and future work.

2

Chapter 2

Background
This chapter provides background on current OT security methods and the application of
deep learning to cyberphysical systems. Because the proposed approach uses deep learning at the
physical layer for OT device security, it is important to establish a level of understanding in both of
these areas.

2.1

Operational Technology Security Methods
The vulnerabilities of OT networks and the ICS devices that use them has been a growing

concern in recent years. High-profile attacks have driven research into ICS security [13], [2], and
garnered national interest [4]. This has led to product development for network access control (NAC)
solutions to address device inventory, authentication, and other tasks.
NAC solutions gain information about devices on the network using two approaches: active
or passive probing. Active scanning involves sending a request for information to each device on
a network and awaiting a response with the desired information. While this approach is effective,
it often causes malfunctions in ICS devices [13]. In order to avoid malfunctions many ICS device
manufacturers have developed their own protocols to manage active probing [13]. However, this
puts an additional burden on network administrators who now must adhere to the specifications of
numerous ICS devices. On the other hand, passive probing monitors network traffic without sending
out any request packets. The primary advantage of this method is that it causes no disruptions to
the ICS devices. This makes it a viable option for OT network security. A disadvantage of passive
3

probing is that this method is dependent upon the packet traffic and information available. If
there is low packet traffic or limited information on received packets, passive scanning might not
work. Nonetheless, in order to maintain the proper operation of ICS devices passive probing is a
practical approach. Active probing can be enacted on a device by device basis, but it is often still
recommended that a degree of passive network monitoring is used for OT networks [3].
The solution to robust security is not as simple as using a hybrid approach. While research
has been conducted into using a hybrid of passive and active probing [14], both are still susceptible
to spoofing attacks at the data link layer [10]. Recently authors of [43] propose a passive fingerprinting method that operates on Ethernet protocol. The author of [42], has shown passive device
management using Modbus protocol. However, for both protocols they do not address the spoofing
concerns of the high-level Layer 2 features they gather from transmission data. The proposal in this
thesis is to passively probe the physical layer to avoid such spoofing. In the following section, deep
learning for passive Ethernet physical layer security will be examined.

2.2

Deep Learning for the Physical Layer
Deep learning is an extension of the machine learning subset of the larger field of artificial

intelligence (AI). Machine learning seeks to create decision based algorithms that can learn from data.
Deep learning extends this to neural networks which can define the decision criteria itself without
input from a user. First made popular in the computer vision space [15], DCNNs have shown to be
more effective than traditional neural networks on tasks like classifying digits [24]. As research has
developed, DCNNs have also shown success in face recognition [18], speech recognition [6], and even
monitoring sensors of self driving cars [9]. The key component of DCNN is the convolutional layer.
Figure 2.1 shows the dot product operation of a convolutional filter. The convolutional layer applies
a filter (blue) to the input image (gray) and produces a dot product output (red). This filter then
strides across the entire image producing a new image on the output. The number of convolutional
layers, the number of filters, and the number of pixels to stride are all user-defined parameters. When
training a convolutional neural network, updating the filter weights pushes the network to choose
the best filters for a set of inputs. Moreover, these convolutional layers can operate in 1-dimension.
Figure 2.2 shows how this method can be reduced to a 1-dimensional operation. This allows efficient
application of these networks to 1-dimensional data as will be explored in this work. As a whole,
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Figure 2.1: Applying a 2D Convolutional Filter

Figure 2.2: Applying a 1D Convolutional Filter

these networks are robust and are integral to the work presented in this thesis.
DCNNs can be leveraged in many different ways in deep learning architectures. There are
instances of binary classification, such as classifying between a cat and dog. There are also instances
of categorical classification, such as classifying between 10 different animals. Binary classification
can be extended to binary detection, such as detecting whether or not it will rain a given day.
Anomaly and novelty detection are a subset of binary detection and are key to identifying out of
distribution (OOD) data [33]. As a result, novelty detection is key to the OOD detection experiments
in later chapters. In context of novelty detection OOD data is data that is outside the data of the
classes that a device trained on. Another application of DCNNs is convolutional autoencoders,
which can be used to compress and reconstruct an image [27]. This use case will be explored in later
chapters. Finally, DCNNs can be deployed with generative adversarial networks (GAN) which seek
5

to reproduce new data from a given distribution. GANs are often used as a data generation tactic
when there is limited data available. This too will be investigated in later chapters.
The DCNN can be focused to address physical layer security. There are instances of deep
learning navigating the physical layer for radar detection [7], cell phone detection [36], and even
heartbeat detection using radio reflections [16]. The goal of this work is to investigate the capacity
of deep learning when applied to physical layer security of Ethernet OT devices. As a result,
these trained models will focus on the discrete hardware components that cause perturbations on
a transmitted signal. Authors in [34] and [35], look at how perturbations are caused by the digital
to analog converter (DAC), power amplifier, and radio frequency (RF) oscillator of a transmitting
device. These imprints also exist in the physical layer transmissions of wired Ethernet devices. The
DCNN in this paper will exploit such imprints on Ethernet transmissions to distinguish between
transmitting devices.

6

Chapter 3

System Pipeline
The pipeline for applying deep learning to physical layer Ethernet security is described in
this chapter. The three sections that will be discussed are data collection, the deep learning model,
and authentication.

3.1

Data Collection
Data collection is necessary for any application of deep learning. For the purposes of this

work, physical layer samples must be collected from each of the devices on a network. This process
is done by digitally sampling voltages from the transmit (TX) pins of each device of interest. The
Siglent SDS2352X-E Super Phosphor Oscilloscope was used for digital data sampling, which has
a 350MHz bandwidth and a sampling rate of 1M samples/second. As shown in Figure 3.1, the
Control/Storage Device pings a Device Under Test to generate a response packet. The SignalSplit printed circuit board (PCB) provides inline access to the Device Under Test TX+/- pins.
This differential data is digitally sampled, truncated, and forwarded by the Oscilloscope to the
Control/Storage Device. This process is repeated 10,000 times for each device. A sample is 5.7 µs
long and results in approximately 11,400 samples.
Clemson University Energy Innovation Center (EIC) is where the majority of the data was
collected that is used in this thesis. The Clemson EIC provided a simulation and testing bed that
was integral for collecting data in an OT network setting from relevant device manufacturers (i.e.
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Woodward, and Allen Bradley). These collections made up
7

Figure 3.1: The components of data acquisition

the Clemson EIC dataset. Other data was collected using off the shelf network switches (i.e. Cisco,
LinkSys, and D-Link). These collections made up the AVS526 dataset. The two Ethernet protocols
that were employed were 10BaseT and 100BaseTX. Figure 3.2 and 3.3 show a comparison of these
two protocols, 10BaseT and 100BaseTX respectively, sampled from an Allen Bradley programmable
logic controller (PLC). Verifying results on gigabit Ethernet and other protocols is left to future
work.

3.2

Deep Learning Model
The DCNN is the part of the pipeline responsible for fingerprinting each device. Deep

learning models were first made popular in the computer vision space [19] and then extended to
the RF signal space [30]. This thesis analyzes transmissions in the time domain, however there
are on going research debates over whether the time or frequency domain is more suited for deep
learning techniques [49], [29]. One major difference between image data and time domain signal
data is that image data is 2-dimensional while time domain signal data is 1-dimensional. Two model
architectures for the DCNN were considered for the experiments in this thesis, the ResNet [30] and
the MCNet [20]. The MCNet proved to be more efficient while achieving competitive accuracy
with the ResNet. Table I compares the attributes and performance of each model. Presentation of
accuracy comparison will be given in the Testing Results chapter.

8

Figure 3.2: Voltage (mV) per sample plot of Allen Bradley PLC in 10BaseT (N =4096)

Figure 3.3: Voltage (mV) per sample plot of Allen Bradley PLC in 100BaseTX (N =4096)

Latency (1 sample)
Throughput (256 samples)
Model File Size (.h5)
Model Training Parameters

ResNet
900ms
150 samples per sec
211MB
2M

MCNet
290ms
750 samples per sec
1.96MB
150k

Table 3.1: MCNet and ResNet comparison tested on Nvidia Jetson Xavier

9

Figure 3.4: Components of DCNN for Classification

3.2.1

Training for Classification
Training the DCNN for classification involves using N sample signal examples taken from

D devices. N is the sample size in range [256, 4096] (by powers of 2) of the example extracted at a
random index from the initial 11,400 sample collection. The chosen value of N samples is mentioned
in all results provided. Figure 3.4 shows a high level overview of the classification DCNN. The data,
a 10BaseT protocol device sample, passes through the convolutional layers, which perform many
layers of feature extraction. These features are then passed through the dense layer with a filter the
same size as the number of classes or devices. A SoftMax activation is applied to the output of this
dense layer and a classification is made. For Figure 3.4 this classification would have a probability
of 0.67.
The convolutional layers involve a complex combination of max pooling and skip connections.
For both DCNNs a categorical crossentropy loss function and Adam optimizer [22] were used, and
each architecture was implemented using the TensorFlow python library [5].
There are two reasons why a classification model is useful. One, it provides evidence that a
group of physical layer devices can be distinguished by a DCNN. Two, it acts as a feature extractor
and compresses representations of devices into lower dimensional space that can be used as a fingerprint. The fingerprint is the output of the final fully connected (dense) layer as shown in Figure 3.4.
A unique fingerprint is generated for each device by passing signal examples through the DCNN and
removing the SoftMax activation. In the following experiments this fingerprint is the D dimensional
output from the dense layer of the DCNN.

10

Figure 3.5: Components of DCNN for Detection

3.2.2

Training for ID/OOD Detection
Training the DCNN for in-distribution (ID) and OOD detection involves inputting the signal

data the same way as with classification. However, the data is now separated by ID devices (positive
or 1) and OOD devices (negative or 0). In a network security scenario, the data from approved or
registered devices would be labeled positives. Then either mock intruder devices would be put on
the network or some artificial data would be used for the negatives. The DCNN can then be trained
in a similar manner as classification, but now with a 1 filter dense layer, binary crossentropy loss,
and Sigmoid activation. This new set up is depicted with only one output node in Figure 3.5. From
the value of the dense layer output the Sigmoid activation suggests it is more likely an ID device
(positive or 1) with value 0.92. The benefits and details in using this model will be discussed in the
next section.

3.3

Authentication
The robust authentication of a device is one of the open ended challenges presented in this

thesis. There are two primary ways that this problem is approached in this thesis. One, a DCNN
creates a fingerprint from the device samples and then machine learning methods are used on this
fingerprint to authenticate the device. Two, a DCNN directly evaluates the device sample to then
authenticate the device.
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3.3.1

Fingerprint Authentication Method
The fingerprint generation method was the first approach that was made to authenticate

the devices. Both of the authentication setups are an application of novelty detection. Novelty
detection is when a model attempts to identify novel pieces of data given access to preexisting data
[17]. In the fingerprint authentication setup, novel data are the fingerprints from an intrusion device
and preexisting data would be the registered fingerprints.
The machine learning model that is best suited for novelty detection is the one-class support
vector machine (OC-SVM) [17]. The OC-SVM can be implemented using the scikit-learn python
library [31].
The OC-SVM proved to have trouble properly authenticating the fingerprints for both registered and intrusion devices. This issue will be discussed in the Authentication Challenge subsection.

3.3.2

Direct Authentication Method
The direct authentication method does not require a fingerprint. Instead, the authentication

prediction is made directly from the DCNN as shown in Figure 3.5. The benefit of using this model
is simplifying the model training process. The creation of fingerprints and training of a OC-SVM
is now unnecessary. Another advantage of using this approach is it allows the model to be used
alongside a GAN more easily.

3.3.3

Authentication Challenge
The issue with improperly authenticating persists with both authentication methods. The

problem is likely related to the fact that the there is limited exposure to the true distribution of
intrusion (or OOD) devices during training in either method. In theory, there are a known number
of registered devices and a much larger unknown number of intrusion devices. Furthermore, there
is limited knowledge of the ways in which these unknown intrusion devices might differ from the
registered devices. The challenge is creating a robust model in these circumstances. A GAN or other
data generation or augmentation method appear to be the best option to do this.
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Chapter 4

Security at the Edge
While deep learning is an effective tool posed to redefine security and the internet of things
(IoT), it is limited by the computational complexity it requires [11]. This has led to a movement in
recent years towards TinyML enabling this complex software to run on low power efficient devices
[37]. For the purposes of this paper, efficient neural network deployment is key to fit the power,
speed, heat, and size requirements of a rack mounted security device. This chapter aims to explain
different approaches to maximizing efficiency of the security model, while maintaining the ability to
update the model to new devices or other variables.

4.1

Model Parameters and Input Size
The number of model parameters is usually what is referred to when reporting the size of a

neural network model. The model parameters have a direct impact on the performance of a neural
network model [12]. For instance, you can see the performance and memory difference of ResNet
and MCNet in Table 4.1, which made a big impact on the decision to use MCNet in this thesis. Not
only do model parameters effect inference speed, they also effect memory requirements and training
time.
The relationship between input size and model parameters is an important item. The input
size is measured in samples (N ). Table 4.1 specifies the relationship using MCNet as the DCNN. Its
clear that the parameters have an exponential relationship with the samples. A minimum input size
is important because the parameters can get large quickly. Model accuracy related to input size is
13

Input Size
256 samples
512 samples
1024 samples
2048 samples
4096 samples
8192 samples

Parameters
120k
123k
129k
142k
166k
215k

Table 4.1: ID/OOD Detection DCNN: Model Parameters vs. Input Size

Latency (1 sample)
Throughput (256 samples)
Model File Size (SavedModel)
Model Accuracy (256 samples)

Before TensorRT
5500ms
45 samples per sec
2.8MB
98%

After TensorRT
1700ms
140 samples per sec
3.3MB
99%

Table 4.2: Comparison of Before and After TensorRT Tested on Nvidia Jetson Xavier

another important topic that will be discussed in results.

4.2

Deployment with TensorRT Conversion
Deploying a neural network with low size, weight, and power (SWaP) is a challenge for

most applications. Neural networks require graphics processing units (GPUs) for optimal speed
and processing. GPUs are hardware that has not existed in low SWaP prior to the advent of deep
learning. There are many devices on the market that meet this need of efficient computation, but this
paper will focus on the Nvidia Jetson Xavier. The Xavier is a 32GB random-access memory (RAM)
device with 512-core Volta GPU and 8-core ARM 64-bit CPU. The advantages of this device are the
size (105mm x 105mm x 65mm), the PCIe connections, and the Gigabit ethernet. Most importantly,
all Nvidia specific software is supported by the large developer community.
The Xavier is compatible with the TensorRT software, which is a software geared towards
making neural networks more efficient. TensorRT claims to optimize a neural network for deployment
in a myriad of ways: weight precision calibration (FP32 ⇔ FP16 ⇔ INT8), layer and tensor fusion,
kernel auto-tuning, and dynamic tensor memory. For more information on how this is done visit
TensorRT documentation [1].
Applying TensorRT to the MCNet DCNN was successful at speeding up inference time of
the model when deployed on a Xavier. The results of this optimization can be seen in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: An example diagram of an autoencoder

4.3

AI for Matched Filter Generation
Because of the computational expense of DCNNs, there is a motivation to eliminate such

neural networks from the deployment pipeline. Matched filter detection is a long standing detection
approach that can serve as a replacement. Matched filter detection is a process of correlating a signal
of interest with a time delayed version of itself or a template. A device specific signal template would
allow the ability to distinguish between different devices on the network. The task becomes creating
an effective template for this detection using AI.
Matched filter generation with deep learning was an idea that was inspired by Google’s Deep
Dream [28]. Deep learning generative models have been documented using a neural network trained
on images to generate new images. This generative approach could possibly be extended to training
on device signals to generate signal templates for a matched filter.
There are two approaches that are made in this work to create a matched filter signal
template. In this section, these two approaches will be presented.
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Figure 4.2: Input into autoencoder. 100BaseTX Jetson Nano transmission. (N = 4096)

4.3.1

Autodecoder Template Generation
The matched filter generation method with deep learning involves a generative model similar

to an autoencoder. Autoencoders are traditionally used to compress or encode a signal into low
dimensional subspace and then decompress or decode the signal back into the original space. An
example of an autoencoder can be seen in Figure 4.1.
A convolutional autoencoder was extended to device signal compression to verify its feasibility. The device signal was a 100BaseTX signal of sample size N = 4096. The encoder network
consisted of two 32 filter convolutional layers each with tanh activation and max pooling with pool
size 2. Each max pool layer reduced the initial signal by a factor of 2. The last layer of the encoder
was a 1 filter convolutional layer with tanh activation. The compressed layer output was then a
vector of size 1024. The decoder portion was the same as the encoder, but it replaced instances
of maxpooling with upsampling layers. The autoencoder is trained with mean squared error loss
and root mean square propagation (RMSprop) optimization [38]. The results of this autoencoder
were verified by the signals in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. Note that both signals are normalized to positive
unit variance. Furthermore, the reconstructed signal appears to contain no high frequency noise or
perturbations. This is a reason for autoencoders to be used for denoising or smoothing purposes in
images [25].
The use of an autoencoder for signal compression and reconstruction has been verified. To
extend this to signal template reconstruction, the idea is to create a reconstruction of an image
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Figure 4.3: Output of autoencoder. Reconstructed 100BaseTX Jetson Nano transmission. (N =
4096)

Figure 4.4: An example diagram of an autodecoder
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Figure 4.5: Genetic binary chromosome and its operations

that optimizes the DCNN classifier. In short, the goal is to create an autodecoder that takes a
compressed signal, expands it out, and compresses back to be classified again. An example of an
autodecoder can be seen in Figure 4.4. An autoencoder tries to reproduce image space x̂ to be x,
while the depicted autodecoder tries to reproduce compressed space ŷ to be y.
As mentioned, the idea is to create a reconstruction of an image that optimizes the DCNN
classifier. This will require an untrained decoder at the front and a frozen, trained DCNN as the
encoder at the back of the network. The only trainable parameters will be part of the decoder. The
loss and optimization are the same as what is used in the autoencoder.
The results of this model were not desirable. Reconstructing a signal that optimizes a DCNN
classifier is possible and was successful. However, the reconstruction did not result in a template
that could be effectively used as a part of a matched filter bank. In an effort to find another way
forward, an evolutionary algorithm was explored.

4.3.2

Evolutionary Algorithm Template Generation
This section explores the use of an evolutionary algorithm. An evolutionary algorithm is

an algorithm inspired by Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. The specific evolutionary algorithm
chosen was a genetic algorithm. A genetic algorithm takes an input vector, usually binary, and
performs crossover and mutations. This is similar to how genetic crossovers and mutations take
place in a chromosome in the natural world. Figure 4.5 depicts a chromosome along with the
crossover and mutation operations. Crossover involves exchanging gene (or bit) values between two
mating chromosomes. Mutation involves sporadically flipping a gene (or bit) to the opposite value
after the mating process. The entire life cycle of a genetic algorithm is shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: The proposed genetic algorithm

4.3.2.1

The Initial Population
The algorithm is a mutli-step process beginning with population initialization. For the

purposes of this thesis, the population was initialized as a ”perfect” square wave preamble as shown
in Figure 4.7. The goal is then to perform enough operations to get the preamble to resemble
a signal template for a 10BaseT device, which would look similar to the Dlink switch 10BaseT
preamble sample in Figure 4.8. Notice both plots are normalized to unit variance over a 5.7 second
window.

4.3.2.2

The Genetic Operations
Genetic algorithms are traditionally used on binary sequences, but in this case the algorithm

is reworked to operate on the floating point preamble. The crossover and mutation operations must
be adapted to floating point operations. A series of floating-point values behaves differently than
a series of bits when introduced to genetic operations. This means that the crossover process
cannot flip between either a one or zero and the mutation process cannot involve flipping a bit.
Furthermore, a signal template should not have significant discontinuities in the floating-point array
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Figure 4.7: Perfect preamble for initial population (5.7s)

Figure 4.8: DLink preamble sample for comparison (5.7s)
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which must be considered in population initialization and genetic operations. Investigating research
into genetic algorithms for artificial reverberations [26], information on applying genetic algorithms
within these parameters was gathered. The primary takeaway was adjusting the uniform crossover
equation. Given individual parent templates x1 and x2 and a random uniform (0, 1] weight w the
new crossover equation is: x = x1 ∗ (w) + x2 ∗ (1 − w). Repeating the crossover equation twice
with new w values would result in two new child templates to carry on for the next population.
This proved to be a way to prevent the discontinuities caused by uniform crossover. Mutation
consisted of mutating the entire N sample example with a set mutation probability. The mutation
occurred by adding random gaussian noise using the mean and standard deviation of 1000 real
10BaseT preambles. Other methods of mutation were tried involving changing the amplitude of
random samples limited by a variable alpha. To help with discontinuities, the perfect square wave
was adjusted at initialization such that it had values at -0.5, 0, and 0.5 at each transition. Finally, a
variable alpha was used to limit discontinuities of genetic operations that had too large of a change
between two consecutive samples. Alpha controlled the amount of difference at a discontinuity.

4.3.2.3

The Fitness Function
The fitness function follows a similar process to the autodecoder. The fitness function is the

DCNN. A template that is fit is one that maximizes the DCNN output probability that a template
classifies as a desired device. As an example, if the DLink switch is device 0, the objective is to
maximize the DCNN classifier Softmax output for device 0. A threshold set for the Softmax output
for device 0 is the fitness score.
The problem with the autodecoder persisted with the evolutionary algorithm. In this case,
the DCNN acting as the fitness function was optimized. However, this signal was noisy and did not
work as a matched filter template. As a result, solving this matched filter problem is left to future
work.

4.4

Filter and Decimation Testing
Following the input size tests, additional bandwidth tests were done focusing on efficiency

from a data perspective. The motivation for bandwidth testing is to establish the minimum sampling
rate that collection equipment can have while still maintaining accurate predictions with the DCNN
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Figure 4.9: Prosoft preamble transmission at cutoff frequency 350Hz (N =4096)

Figure 4.10: Prosoft preamble transmission at a decimation of 2 (N =4096)
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Figure 4.11: Prosoft preamble transmission at cutoff frequency 10Hz (N =4096)

classifier. A smaller minimum sampling rate can mean smaller and cheaper sampling equipment
for the system pipeline. In addition, separate filtering tests are done to help understand what the
DCNN learned about our signals.
The first experiment with bandwidth was to perform decimation and filtering on the input
data. The decimation and filtering experiments decimated the signal example and applied an antialiasing filter using python’s SciPy library [45]. The anti-aliasing filter used was an order 8 Chebyshev
type 1 filter. As an example, a signal example with 4096 samples decimated by 2 would then be
2048 samples. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show an example of a Prosoft device preamble with 10BaseT
protocol size 4096 samples and then decimated to 2048 samples. They appear similar. Note neither
signal is normalized and is presented in milliVolts.
Another advantage of bandwidth testing on input signal data is that it brings insight to the
frequencies that the distinguishing features take place. While deep learning is often a black box,
knowing the significant frequency information of a device signal is useful in understanding what
allows the DCNN classifier to learn. The filtering process employed was simple. Incoming data was
filtered with an order 2 low pass Butterworth filter again using SciPy. In the results section, it is
clear at what frequencies the DCNN makes its decisions by monitoring the training curves. Here we
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can see the difference in the appearance of a Prosoft device preamble at 350MHz cutoff frequency
and 10MHz bandwidth in Figures 4.9 and 4.11 respectively. The results will show that there is a
significant difference in training accuracy for these two signals.

4.5

Transfer Learning
Transfer learning is an important topic for edge deployment. In this section, efficiency from

a training perspective will be considered. When operating at the edge, training a new DCNN model
from scratch is an inefficient way of adding a device to the registered pool. Adding a device in this
way requires many hours of model training time. Transfer learning offers a solution to this problem.
Transfer learning is traditionally deployed when adapting a model to a new data domain.
For instance training a dog breed classifier on photos of dogs on a sunny day, would likely not
perform well on photos of dogs in the evening with worse lighting. In such a case, transfer learning
on breeds of dogs in this new lighting would allow accurate classification without training from
scratch. Transfer learning on a DCNN works by freezing all but the final fully connected layers of
the model. Then retraining on the new dataset only updating the final layer weights. The result is
a model that can adapt to the new training domain in a few epochs.
The experiment conducted with transfer learning sets up a scenario where a proposed new
device is transfer learned updating the DCNN model. This use of transfer learning is different than
what is traditionally used. Nevertheless, the pre-trained convolutional layers allow this model to
adapt effectively. In the results, the success of the transfer learning experiments will be demonstrated.
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Chapter 5

OOD Detection for Authentication
This chapter discusses the role of OOD detection for authentication of OT devices. The
experiments discussed in this chapter examine the role that ID and OOD data plays on the success
of an OOD detector.

5.1

OOD Devices and The Authentication Problem
OOD devices present a considerable challenge when authenticating devices on a OT network.

In context of this thesis, OOD devices represent the pool of unknown intruder devices. The challenge
is that the DCNN used for authentication contains no direct knowledge about this pool of devices.
The only knowledge about whether a transmitting device is an intruder is given by the registered
(label 1) and known intruder devices (label 0). As a result the authentication is highly dependent
on the pool of devices chosen for registered and known intruder datasets.
The pool of registered devices should not be eliminated in an authentication scenario. However, the pool of known intruders can be manipulated such that it makes the DCNN the most capable
of accurate OOD detection. The experiment introduced in the results examines whether adding a
larger pool of known intruders increases the likelihood of detecting an unknown intruder.
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of Generative Autoencoder

5.2

Data Generation for OOD Detection
This section explores data generation for OOD detection. Two deep learning architectures,

the autoencoder and the GAN, will be considered in an effort to generate accurate data. Its important
to note that not all data is good to generate. For the purposes of this work, data must be generated to
resemble the registered devices. Assuming the generation is not perfect, this would allow a classifier
to train on data representing the boundary conditions of a registered device.

5.3

The Generative Autoencoder
Autoencoders are used to compress data in a latent dimension and then reconstruct it to

the original shape. In doing so the decoder portion of an autoencoder creates an understanding
of images in compressed latent space. The goal of the generative autoencoder experiments is to
leverage this understanding by taking random points in the latent space to generate new data.
The architecture of this generative autoencoder is shown in Figure 5.1. There are three steps
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to training with the generative autoencoder. The first step is to train the autoencoder with mean
squared error loss and RMSprop optimization. When a low loss is reached, the second step is to
generate data. The generation process involves generating a random vector representing the latent
space and constructing this vector into a signal using the decoder. In the third step, the classifier,
or the DCNN, then trains on the reconstructed data as registered device data and the generated
data as intruder data.
The results of this experiment are not presented in the following section. Although the
autoencoder was capable of generating data that looked somewhat similar, it failed to improve the
OOD detection of the DCNN on intruder data.

5.4

The One Class Generative Adversarial Network
This section looks at the One Class Generative Adversarial Network (OCGAN) for OOD

detection data generation [32]. The researchers behind the OCGAN try to address the novelty
detection problem by generating data that closely resembles the data from the one known class.
The one known class in the experiment presented is the pool of registered devices. Figure 5.2 lays
out the architecture of the OCGAN.
The architecture is complex, but it is simpler if thought of in three parts: the generator, the
discriminator, and the classifier. The generator is made up of the encoder and decoder, while the
discriminator is made up of the latent discriminator and the visual discriminator. Adversarial
training takes place between the generator and the discriminator. Adversarial training is best
described as a tug of war between neural networks. The generator attempts to make the most
convincing fake data possible, while the discriminator seeks to distinguish this fake data from real
data. From Figure 5.2 it is apparent the visual discriminator seeks to distinguish real from fake
by looking at the generated signals. The latent discriminator seeks to distinguish real from fake by
looking at the latent space. The classifier is independent of the adversarial training.
As the OCGAN trains, there will inevitably be a winner of this tug of war. In the experiments conducted it was often the discriminator. This is likely because the generator struggled to
properly mimic the one class registered data. However, experiments were still conducted to evaluate
whether the OCGAN can generate data that improves the classifiers OOD detection performance.
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of One Class Generative Adversarial Network
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Chapter 6

Results
In this chapter results will be presented and discussed in the order of each experiment
that was discussed in the preceding chapters. Results are only given from experiments that were
successful or provide useful information.

6.1

Classification Results
The classification results are available for ResNet and MCNet models. The two protocols

evaluated are 10BaseT and 100BaseTX. These setups were evaluated with the two datasets provided
below.

6.1.1

Clemson EIC Dataset
The Clemson EIC dataset consists of data from 15 devices collected on the testing and simu-

lation bed in the Clemson EIC. There were several devices that made up this dataset, each providing
a monitoring function for the simulated power system. A DCNN that can effectively classify these
devices is able to gather distinguishing information that can be later used for authentication.
The resulting confusion matrix of applying the ResNet and MCNet DCNNs for classification
of 10BaseT preamble transmissions are shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. To save space, Table 6.1
provides the device names. The results from the ResNet are not as high as the training data
suggested. It was projected to be on par with the MCNet. This is possibly due to overfitting on
the training data. Overfitting is when a model learns its training data too well, and as a result can
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generalize to unseen data [39]. The confusion matrix for MCNet tells another story. It appears this
model learned the training data well and is now highly effective at distinguishing the devices in the
dataset. However, the confusion matrix shows the MCNet still struggled to distinguish certain pairs
of devices. One such pair is devices 7 and 13. Device 7 misclassified examples from device 13 up to
59 times. Table 6.1 reveals that these two devices are the same Woodward 3000XT device model.
This means that although the DCNNs are capable of distinguishing two devices of the same device
model, they are still not perfectly distinct.
Device Number
Device 0
Device 1
Device 2
Device 3
Device 4
Device 5
Device 6
Device 7
Device 8
Device 9
Device 10
Device 11
Device 12
Device 13
Device 14

Device Name
Allen Bradley
Prosoft
SEL651R A
SEL735
SEL751
Woodward EZG 3500XT
Woodward EZG 3500XT
Woodward LCD 3000XT
SEL451
SEL651R B
SEL2440
Woodward EZG 3400XT
Woodward EZG 3400XT
Woodward LCD 3000XT
SMA EDMMUS10

A
B
A

A
B
B

Table 6.1: Names of Devices in Clemson EIC Dataset

6.1.2

AVS526 Dataset
The AVS526 dataset is a larger dataset with 27 devices collected in a custom local net-

work scenario. This collection setup aimed to test the robustness of a DCNN for Ethernet device
classification.
The resulting confusion matrix of applying the ResNet and MCNet DCNNs for classification
of 100BaseTX transmissions are shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. As done previously, Table 6.2 provides
the device and port names. For this dataset the ResNet and MCNet both have high accuracy. This
means that trained appropriately, these DCNN models are robust to several devices even when some
are the same device models or different ports on the same device. The scale with which these DCNN
models classify, suggests that they can collect distinguishable information even on larger networks.
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Figure 6.1: ResNet confusion matrix evaluated on 10BaseT Clemson EIC devices (N =4096)
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Figure 6.2: MCNet confusion matrix evaluated on 10BaseT Clemson EIC devices (N =4096)
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The preponderance of errors occurred between devices 20 and 25 for both DCNN models. In this
case, rather than the same device models causing the errors, the errors came from two ports on the
same DLink device.
Device Number
Device 0
Device 1
Device 2
Device 3
Device 4
Device 5
Device 6
Device 7
Device 8
Device 9
Device 10
Device 11
Device 12
Device 13
Device 14
Device 15
Device 16
Device 17
Device 18
Device 19
Device 20
Device 21
Device 22
Device 23
Device 24
Device 25
Device 26

Device Name
Xavier 1A
Cisco Port2
Cisco Port7
Siglent 1A
Siglent 1B
Cisco Port3
Cisco Port8
Pluggable USB A
Cisco Port4
Cisco Port9
Pluggable USB B
Cisco Port10
Cisco Port5
RPI CCard A
RPI CCard B
Linksys Port1
Xavier 2
Linksys INet
Siglent 2
DLink Port1
DLink Port2
Cisco Port6
DLink Port3
DLink Port4
DLink Port5
Cisco Port1
Xavier 1B

Table 6.2: Names of Devices in AVS526 Dataset

6.2

Input Size Testing Results
The input size tests were conducted in order to determine the smallest input size necessary

to maintain a high accuracy for the DCNN classifiers. The MCNet was the only model used in these
experiments. As with the classification results, the two scenarios analyzed were the Clemson EIC
dataset with 10BaseT protocol and the AVS526 dataset with 100BaseTX.
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Figure 6.3: ResNet confusion matrix evaluated on 100BaseTX AVS526 devices (N =4096)
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Figure 6.4: MCNet confusion matrix evaluated on 10BaseT AVS526 devices (N =4096)
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Figure 6.5: MCNet loss and accuracy curves for each N from 10BaseT Clemson EIC dataset
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Figure 6.6: MCNet loss and accuracy curves for each N from 100BaseTX AVS526 dataset
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6.2.1

Clemson EIC Dataset
The MCNet Clemson EIC dataset training accuracy and loss curves are shown in Figure 6.5.

From the loss curves its clear that the more samples the better performance. Diminishing accuracy
returns take place with increasing input samples. Values of N that are 1024 and greater achieve
at least 90% accuracy. The results suggest that choosing an input size N that is at least 2048 will
achieve high accuracy with sufficient training.

6.2.2

AVS526 Dataset
The AVS526 dataset results tell a similar story in Figure 6.6. The curves for this dataset

are more compact. Values of N that are 512 and greater achieve at least 90%. This is less samples
than is required for the 10BaseT data. Also in this case, the results suggest choosing an input size
N that is at least 1024 will achieve high accuracy with sufficient training. Furthermore, the results
show input size may be more sensitive for 10BaseT than for 100BaseTX. This would have to be
investigated further.

6.3

Filter and Decimation Testing Results
The results in this section cover anti-aliasing decimation and low pass filter testing. The

purpose of anti-aliasing filter decimation is to determine the necessary sampling rate for the data
collection. The purpose of the low pass filter is to help understand what the DCNN model is learning
by filtering out frequency information.

6.3.1

Anti-Aliasing Decimation Test
For this test an anti-aliasing decimation filter was applied to the input data of the MCNet.

Figure 6.7 depicts the accuracy and loss over training epochs. For the decimation, an order 8
Chebyshev type 1 filter was used. The decimation rates for a 4096 sample input were chosen to be 2,
4, and 8. Referencing back to Figure 4.10, its apparent that for smaller decimation rates the input
signal looks similar. Furthermore, a signal sampled at 4096 samples and decimated by 2, and a signal
just sampled at 2048 contain different information. Figure 6.7 shows that it takes a decimation of at
least 8 to make a significant impact on the training. This information is consequential for sampling
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Figure 6.7: MCNet loss and accuracy curves for each decimation rate (N = 4096) from 100BaseTX
AVS526 dataset
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Figure 6.8: MCNet loss and accuracy curves for each cutoff frequency (N = 512) from 10BaseT
Clemson EIC dataset
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Figure 6.9: MCNet loss and accuracy curves for each cutoff frequency (N = 4096) from 10BaseT
Clemson EIC dataset
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device decisions. The results suggest the DCNN model can work well with a lower sampling rate
than is used with the oscilloscope.

6.3.2

Low Pass Filter Test
The low pass filter test was applied to the input data of the MCNet. The filter used was

an order 2 Butterworth low pass filter. The cutoff frequencies chosen were 350, 200, 100, 75, 50,
40, 30, 20, and 10MHz. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 examine the accuracy and loss over training epochs for
the MCNet with 512 samples and 4096 samples respectively. Both sample sizes were chosen because
they show the difference performance when filtering.
It is apparent from the curves that the lower the cutoff frequency the lower the training
accuracy. For Figure 6.8, it is evident that there is a drop off in accuracy for frequencies of 20
and 10MHz. For Figure 6.9, this drop off is only distinct at 10MHz. These curves indicate that
there is important frequency information between 10-30MHz. This is evidence that a transmission
component that perturbs the signal at these frequencies allows the DCNN to distinguish devices to
some degree.
There are two additional takeaways from the results presented. The first is that there is still
crucial frequency information below 10MHz for both sample sizes. Looking back to Figures 4.9 and
4.11, its obvious there is a large difference in a signal filtered at 350MHz and one at 10MHz with the
latter looking more like a sine wave. Yet, this sine wave carries useful information for the DCNN.
This information may operate at a much lower frequency than what was examined. The second
takeaway is that the smaller the input sample size the less adaptable to frequency information.
The 512 sample input MCNet is hindered further by the 20MHz cutoff than the 4096 sample input
MCNet. This hints that there may be a relationship between the lower MHz frequency information
and a larger input sample size. Lower frequency periodic information would likely require more
samples to understand. For both takeaways, more evidence is necessary to make a conclusion. This
is left for future work.

6.3.3

Transfer Learning Results
The transfer learning experiment setup was simple. The test used the 27 device AVS526

dataset. The input data was divided into three sets of devices. The first set is one device representing
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Registered Decision
Intruder Decision

Before Transfer Learning
69.24%
30.76%

After Transfer Learning
99.98%
99.97%

Table 6.3: Prediction Accuracy of MCNet on New Device Before and After Transfer Learning (Avg.
5 runs)

the registered devices. One device is used for simplicity. The second set is one device representing
the device to add to the network. The third set is a group of 5 devices representing the known
intruder devices. Each group of devices will be chosen at random from the dataset. The results
are averaged over 5 runs with new random sets each time. The DCNN model used was a MCNet
trained for direct authentication as is described in Section 3.3.2. This model was trained initially
on the first and third sets of data. Transfer learning for a new class involves freezing all but the last
dense layer for the DCNN. Then retraining the last layer of the model with the second set added to
the first. This then makes a new registered device. If instead, the goal was to add the new device
to a list of intruders the second set would be added to the third.
For the purposes of this experiment, its important to note that a new device will be considered registered or intruding by the DCNN before ever knowing said device. This can be thought
of as the prior decision before transfer learning. The first column of Table 6.3 explains how the
new device was decided for the 5 runs. The new device is predicted to be registered 69.24% of the
time before training, and the other times it was considered an intruder. So the data indicates a
bias towards being registered. The second column indicates how the device performed once being
transfer learned for 1 epoch. Whether the new data was added to the registered pool or the known
intruder pool it performed well.
The primary advantage of transfer learning is the significant reduction in adding a new
device to a DCNN model. Transfer learning for 1 epoch takes about 40 seconds, while training a
model from scratch takes at least 1.5 hours.

6.4

OOD Detection Testing
The OOD detection experiment was motivated by the question of whether increasing the

known intruder devices would increase the likelihood of detecting the unknown, or OOD, intruder
devices. The test used the 27 device AVS526 dataset. The input data was separated into three sets
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5 Known Intruders
10 Known Intruders
15 Known Intruders

OOD Detection Accuracy
62.40%
50.14%
48.26%

Table 6.4: OOD Detection Accuracy with Varying Number of Known Intruders (Avg. 15 runs)

of devices. The first set is one device representing the registered devices. The second set is a group
of three different sizes, 5, 10 and 15 devices, representing the known intruder devices. The third set
is a holdout group of 5 devices representing the unknown intruder devices. Each group of devices
was chosen at random from the dataset. The results were averaged over 15 runs with new random
sets each time. The direct authentication MCNet model was used as is described in Section 3.3.2.
This model was trained on the first and second device sets. In each run, the DCNN was trained
three times for each of the three sizes, 5, 10 and 15, of the known intruder devices.
The results of the prediction on the holdout set with the three known intruder sizes is
shown in Table 6.4. The results did not meet expectations. It turns out the the more known
intruder devices, the less accurate OOD detection. This is relationship is counter-intuitive. It would
seem, the more devices in a category the more the decision space shrinks. Further testing would
have to be done to support this conclusion.

6.5

OOD Data Generation Testing
The OOD data generation experiment utilized the OCGAN. The architecture of the OCGAN

allows for the training of the GAN and the classifier in parallel. The implementation of the OCGAN
followed its paper closely, but the informative negative mining was left out. Informative negative
mining offered a way of improving the model by training the latent space and it was determined this
was not necessary. Training the OCGAN took place in four steps: pre-training the autoencoder,
training the discriminators, training the generator, and training the classifier.
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 6.5. The table reveals that training
the DCNN with OCGAN generated data actually reduces the OOD detection performance. The
results were not ideal, but they follow a similar trend to OOD detection testing. The trend suggests
that generating more OOD data can cause reduced OOD detection accuracy. Because the OCGAN
research is verified it is more likely that the performance degradation is related to the way the
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Before OCGAN
After OCGAN

OOD Detection Accuracy
60.8%
45.1%

Table 6.5: OOD Detection Accuracy with OCGAN Data Generation over 20000 epochs (Avg. 3
runs)

OCGAN was implemented. One such reason is the lack of a effective means of navigating the latent
space. Generating data for novelty detection is only useful if it closely resembles known data. Its
possible that the generator was not able to generate data of high fidelity. As a result the useless data
served to confuse the DCNN rather than improve it. Regardless of the reason behind unsuccessful
OOD detection, finding a means of generating and evaluating data for this purpose is left for future
work.

45

Chapter 7

Conclusions and Discussion
Physical layer OT Ethernet device authentication using deep learning can redefine security
for power systems. While legacy and low power ICS devices fail to operate in tandem with IT
network active scanning technologies, its key to look to passive approaches. Additionally, spoofing
attacks can be prevented by authenticating devices at the physical layer. It is shown that discrete
physical components within a OT network device impose distinguishable perturbations on Ethernet
transmissions. Neural networks, such as the DCNN, are able to leverage these distinguishable
perturbations for device authentication. A system pipeline for the deep learning solution involves
Ethernet device transmission data collection, training a DCNN on this data, and authenticating
with the DCNN. It is shown that although distinguishing between known devices on a network is
successful, the challenge of robust detection of unknown devices is a substantial task.
Future work should explore a reliable means of making an authentication decision on devices
that the DCNN has not yet seen. Data generation for novelty detection with GANs is a promising
approach. Another possible approach is metric learning using the DCNN fingerprint. Research into
the specific hardware components that cause distinguishing perturbations may help with this data
generation process. If successful, a natural extension would be to find applications of physical layer
authentication in the wireless space.
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